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Disputes concerning international watercourses have been resolved in a variety of ways in the past. This paper 
builds upon the dispute resolution framework put forward in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses and state practice to develop a dispute resolution framework which 
will bring more efficient results for riparian states. This process emphasises the important role that fact finding can 
have in this context. Using this investigative process at an early stage in the dispute resolution process helps to 
reduce the areas of conflict between the states and provides a platform to encourage negotiations. The framework 
outlined also allows for recourse to negotiations, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or arbitration if a 
resolution cannot be found. Recourse to the ICJ and arbitral tribunals has been left to the final stage of the 
framework to reflect state practice in the area. If this style of dispute resolution framework is adopted by states it 
should allow for disputes to be resolved efficiently. In turn this is likely to increase the awareness and support for 
fact finding as an alternative means of dispute resolution in international relations more broadly. 
 
Key Words: dispute resolution, international watercourse, fact finding. 
 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 14,987. 
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I. Introduction 
Water is a precious resource, vital for sustaining life. It is also a resource which is becoming 
increasingly scarce as the world’s population continues to grow. One of the main issues 
connected with the world’s increasing demands for water is that a large proportion of the water 
used by states is drawn from shared resources.
1
 As demand increases, the amount of water drawn 
from these shared resources also increases. This can detrimentally impact other riparian states as 
the quantity and quality of water they receive may deteriorate.   
 
The adverse impacts of increasing the amount of water drawn from a shared resource can result 
in disputes between states as to the nature of each states right to use the resource, and the 
conditions of such use. There is the scope for these disputes to intensify due to the essential 
nature of clean water access. This risk of conflict was emphasised by the World Bank’s Vice 
President for Environmentally Sustainable Development, Ismael Serageldin, in 1995 when he 
said that “many of the wars of this century were about oil, but wars of the next century will be 
over water”.
2
 It is the aim of this paper to explore the mechanisms that states can use to resolve 
the issues that they have relating to the use of water without resorting to physical conflict. 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 1997 (UN Convention) provides states with a framework for dispute resolution. 
However, to date states have not followed this process to its conclusion. State practice 
demonstrates that states have preferred to use binding third party dispute resolution as a final 
step when resolving their disputes, rather than resorting to fact finding which is the final stage of 
the UN Convention. This result is somewhat surprising considering that decisions from the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and arbitral tribunals in this area have not always provided 
parties with practical decisions which have allowed them to move forward in their relationships.  
 
The practice adopted by states may reflect a perception that fact finding adds little to the process 
of dispute resolution once the matter has gone through a legal or arbitral process. States’ 
reluctance to engage in fact finding also reflects the relative neglect that this process has had in 
recent times, despite its lengthy history. Although the United Nations (UN) has increasingly 
                                                           
1
 There are over 300 watercourses shared by two or more states globally. Patricia Wouters “Universal and Regional 
Approaches to Resolving International Water Disputes: What Lessons Learned From State Practice?” in The 
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed) Resolution of International Water Disputes (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 2003) 111 at 114.  
2
 Barbara Crossette “Severe Water Crisis Ahead for Poorest Nations in Next 2 Decades” The New York Times (New 
York, 10 August 1995). 
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made use of fact finding since the Agenda for Peace was launched in 1992, it still remains 
largely ignored. In light of this, this paper will argue that fact finding can be of practical use in 
the dispute resolution process but only if it is engaged with in the early stages of the dispute 
resolution process. 
 
To demonstrate how fact finding could operate in practice the final part of this paper puts 
forward a suggested structure for dispute resolution in the context of international watercourses. 
The process mooted combines elements of the UN Convention and state practice. It provides for 
states to begin to resolve a dispute using fact finding procedures. If this process is insufficient to 
resolve the matter the information found through the fact finding process can be used as a basis 
for direct negotiations. It is envisaged this will enable states to resolve the majority of disputes in 
this area. If these steps prove unsuccessful, the final option is for states to submit the matter to 
either the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal for determination.  This final stage reflects the general 
reluctance by states to submit disputes to a third party for determination and mirrors state 
practice in this area.
3
  
 
The first part of this paper will provide a broad overview of the law and dispute resolution 
processes available in the context of international watercourses. It will go on to show how these 
processes have been used in practice by states. The second part focuses on why the way states 
approach the issue has differed from that set out in the UN Convention. Finally, the paper sets 
out an alternative approach that can be adopted by states. It is argued that this approach is likely 
to be more successful than both the UN Convention approach, and those processes undertaken by 
states without a joint commission established to deal with watercourse matters. A move towards 
this suggested structure in this area has the power to resolve more watercourse disputes at an 
earlier stage in the process which will lessen the likelihood that states will engage in physical 
conflict over rights in international watercourses in the coming years.  
II. International Watercourses 
There are a wide range of bodies of water on the earth, from rivers and lakes to the sea, each of 
which can be subject to quite different types of disputes. As this paper is focusing on dispute 
resolution, it is important that the subject matter of the disputes examined is relatively similar. In 
order to achieve this, the scope of the paper will be confined to disputes concerning international 
watercourses.  
                                                           
3
 J. G. Merrils International Dispute Settlement (4
th
 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2005) at 63;  
Geoffrey Palmer “Perspectives on International Dispute Settlement from a Participant” (2012) 43 VUWLR 36 at 72; 
John Merrils “The Means of Dispute Settlement” in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law (2
nd
 ed, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2006) 533 at 547-548. 
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Watercourses are defined in the UN Convention as “a system of surface waters and groundwaters 
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a 
common terminus”.
4
  These bodies of water are internationalized when they flow between two or 
more states, or when they form the border between two states.  Although watercourses are 
broadly defined in the UN Convention, this paper will focus on the above ground aspect of the 
watercourse system, due to the different rules that to underground aquifers.  
 
The scope of this paper will be further confined by focusing on issues related to the development 
and management of an international watercourse, rather than navigational or boundary related 
issues.  The issues focussed on arise due to the variety of uses for a watercourse. Not only can 
the water be drawn to supply drinking water to a population, it also has a range of economic 
uses. Water is an essential resource in growing crops, and many industrial processes. With 
changes in technology rivers can also provide a means of producing electricity through the 
establishment of hydro-electric power stations.
5
  
 
All of these activities can have an impact on other users of the water resource through reducing 
the water supply, polluting the waterway or causing flooding through damming. It is important 
that states recognize the adverse effects that their actions can have on other states, even if the 
activity they are undertaking has positive implications for their own population. A range of 
specific disputes will be discussed in later sections of this paper which will provide clear 
examples of the nature of the problems that can arise through the development of a watercourse.   
III. Nature of Disputes in this Area 
The adverse impact that the development of a watercourse by one state can have on another is 
generally the starting point for a dispute. In order to minimise these disputes, principles of 
international law have arisen to provide states with guidelines for the acceptable development of 
an international watercourse.  
                                                           
4
 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (opened for signature 25 May 
1997, not yet in force), art 2 [Watercourse Convention]. 
5
 Attila Tanzi and Maurizio Arcari The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: a 
framework for sharing (Kluwer Law International, London, 2001) at 7; Stephen C McCaffery The Law of 
International Watercourses (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2007) at 49 – 50. 
 RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE DISPUTES  
8 
 
A. Legal Framework: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses 
The principles of international law that have developed in the context of international 
watercourses are outlined in the UN Convention. Some aspects of the UN Convention are 
“widely regarded as reflecting ... rules of customary international law” in the area, despite the 
UN Convention not yet being in force.
6
 The key principles relating to the use of international 
watercourses fall within that category.
7
 The first principle which guides the development of an 
international watercourse is that watercourses must be utilized in a manner that is equitable and 
reasonable.
8
 The second principle is that the use or development of an international watercourse 
by one state must not cause significant harm to another riparian state.
9
 
 
Despite these rules being in place problems have arisen in this area due to the apparent 
inconsistencies between them.
10
 If a state is taking actions to gain an equitable share of a 
watercourse they may be at risk of causing significant harm to another riparian state in the 
process, particularly those riparian states that are located further downstream. In order to help 
resolve this issue the International Law Commission (ILC), through its development of the UN 
Convention, has attempted to reconcile the need for development of international watercourses, 
with the protection of states’ established uses.
11
  
 
                                                           
6
 Lucius Caflisch Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2007) at 789. 
7
 M.M. Rahaman “Principles of International Water Law” (2009) 1(3) International Journal of Sustainable Society 
207 at 210; Stephen McCaffery “The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls” in M.A. Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (eds) International 
Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict (World Bank Technical Paper No. 414, 1998) 17at 
24, 27. 
8
 See: Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 6; McCaffery, above n 5, 384-405.  
9
 See: Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 7; McCaffery , above n 5, 406 – 445. 
10
 See: M.A. Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes (eds) International Watercourses: Enhancing 
Cooperation and Managing Conflict (World Bank Technical Paper No. 414, 1998). 
11
 In drafting the UN Convention, the ILC was given the task of codifying the principles of international law in this 
area, which included the notion that watercourses must be shared equitably and states must refrain from doing harm 
to others. They had to frame the principles in the Convention in a way that would be acceptable to states and which 
would allow for the “utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international 
watercourses”. Progressive development and codification of the rules of international law relating to international 
watercourses GA Res 2669 A/Res/2669 (1970); Watercourse Convention, above n 4, preamble. As has been noted 
by Stephen McCaffery, “the language finally adopted by represents an attempt to strike a balance between the 
equitable-utilization and “no harm” rules.” McCaffery, above n 5, at 365. 
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In reconciling the principles the UN Convention has applied a principle of limited territorial 
sovereignty.
12
 This means that states do not have an unlimited right to utilize the water which 
flows within their territory. It also means that the principle of reasonable and equitable use does 
not equate to a strictly equal share of the water resource.
13
 Reasonable and equitable use of the 
water resource is instead determined by looking at a range of relevant factors. Factors considered 
under the approach in the UN Convention include the geographic and climatic conditions of the 
riparian states, the economic needs of the states, and the protection of the resource and the 
availability of alternative resources.
14
 
 
Evaluating a broad range of factors before development proceeds seems to provide some 
protection for existing uses. However, the provisions relating to the obligation not to cause 
significant harm appear to weaken this protection.
15 
Article 7(2) of the UN Convention provides 
that if a state undertakes an activity which would cause significant harm to another state, that 
state shall attempt to mitigate the harm, or “discuss the question of compensation”.
16
 This 
provides a way for states to make use of a watercourse and permissibly cause harm to another 
riparian state through providing the effected state with compensation.
17
 
 
Even in light of this attempt to reconcile the legal principles, there still remains disagreements as 
to what constitutes significant harm and in what circumstances monetary compensation is 
appropriate. Determining where the balance between these two principles should lie is outside of 
the scope of this paper. For current purposes it is sufficient to recognise that the current 
uncertainty in this area of international law means that disputes between states will continue to 
arise. An implication of this is that states will often have to have recourse to various methods of 
dispute resolution in order to resolve disagreements that occur. 
                                                           
12
 This can be contrasted with a principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, or the Harmon doctrine, which saw 
states argue that they should have the ability to control all watercourses within their territory, without regard for the 
implications such actions may have on other states.  Tanzi and Arcari, above n 5, at 11 – 15; McCaffery, above n 5, 
at 112 – 147. 
13
 Tanzi and Arcari, above n 5, at 14 – 15; McCaffery, above n 5, at 135 – 147. 
14
 Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 6(1). 
15
 This is because the requirement not to cause harm is not absolute; states may negotiate if there is a risk that harm 
will be caused and they may provide compensation if this is the case. The rights of the other riparian states should 
also be taken into account in determining what is equitable use, but they are not determinative. Lusius Caflisch 
“Regulation of the Uses of International Watercourses” in in M.A. Salman and Laurence Boisson de Chazournes 
(eds) International Watercourses: Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict (World Bank Technical Paper 
No. 414, 1998) 3 at 13, 14; McCaffery, above n 5, at 411 – 412; Tanzi and Arcari, above n 5, at 152 – 154.  
16
 Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 7(2). 
17
 Art 7(2).  
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IV. Dispute Settlement Principles  
Due to the lack of consensus on the principles that should guide the development and 
management of an international watercourse, the international community has had to determine 
appropriate methods to resolve the disputes that arise in this context. In doing this the principle 
of peaceful settlement of disputes found in the UN Charter remains paramount.
18
  
 
Many states that have a watercourse, such as a river or basin, situated either in their territory, or 
acting as their boundary, have an agreement with co-riparian states providing for the 
management of the watercourse. These often contain dispute resolution provisions. However, 
this is not the case for all states in this situation, especially those that have not utilized the 
international watercourses in their territory in the past. For the latter group the UN Convention 
provides practical guidance on dispute settlement in this area.    
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 
The UN Convention was the result of over 30 years of work by the ILC and was opened for 
signature on 21 May 1997.
19
 To date the UN Convention has been adopted by 30 states, five 
short of the 35 required for the UN Convention to enter into force.
20
 Despite the UN Convention 
having not yet entered in force, its provisions are seen as reflecting customary international 
law.
21
   
 
Article 33 of the UN Convention provides the framework for the peaceful resolution of disputes. 
This provision was one of the most contentious articles during the development of the UN 
Convention, and states expressed a range of reservations about it.
22
  
 
Some states objected to the inclusion of any compulsory third party dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
23
 These states were generally upstream riparians who wanted to protect their strong 
                                                           
18
 Charter of the United Nations, art 33. 
19
 The Convention was passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 21 May 1997, 103 votes in favour, 3 
against (China, Turkey, Burundi) and 27 abstentions. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses A/RES/51/299 (1997).   
20
 Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 36; “Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses” United Nations Treaty Database (1 October 2013) 
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en>. 
21
 Rahaman, above n 7, at 210-211; McCaffery , above n 7, at 24,27. 
22
 Wouters, above n 1, at 121. 
23
 Tanzi and Arcari, above n 5, at 281. 
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position and included states such as France, Israel, Rwanda and India.
24
 In support of this 
position Israel argued that “parties to a dispute must be allowed to choose the mechanism that is 
most appropriate for their specific needs and circumstances”.
25
 
  
A variation on this argument was put forward by states including China and Turkey who argued 
that binding procedures could be included as options in the UN Convention, but they should still 
require states consent before they are able to be used.
26
 Huseyin E. Celem on behalf of Turkey 
commented that:
 27
 
 
... it was not appropriate for a framework convention to foresee any compulsory rules 
regarding the settlement of disputes, [it is] a matter which should be left to the discretion 
of states concerned. 
 
In support of this position Chinese representatives argued in the General Assembly that the 
mandatory settlement of disputes would go against the principle of free choice set out in the UN 
Charter.
28
  
 
However, some states thought that compulsory procedures, which concluded in a binding result, 
were required in order for a resolution of the dispute to be guaranteed.
29
 In the UN General 
Assembly Ahmad Kamal, on behalf of Pakistan, stated his country’s reservations about the 
dispute resolution procedure for this reason.
30
 This view seemed to have been shared by the first 
Special Rapporteur on the topic, Stephen M. Schwebel, who expressed the view that “non-
negotiable impasses as well as dilatory tactics are ... contrary to the long-run interests of all”.
31
 
 
The final version of Article 33 can be seen as providing a compromise between these rival 
positions, by providing a final option for dispute resolution that is mandatory to enter at the 
                                                           
24
 McCaffery, above n 7, at 26; Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
A/RES/51/299 (1997).  
25
 Press Release: General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses GA/9248 (1997) at 7-8. 
26
 Tanzi and Arcari, above n 5, at 281; See Also: Aaron Schwabach “United Nations Convention on the Law of 
Non-navigational uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the Interests of Developing 
Upper Riparian’s” (1998) 33(2) Texas International Law Journal 257 at 274; Press Release, above n 25, at 6. 
27
 Press Release, above n 25, at 4. 
28
 At 5. 
29
 Tanzi and Arcari, above n 5, at 282. 
30
 Press Release, above n 25, 4 -5.  
31
 Stephen M Schwebel Third Report on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses A/CN.4/348 
and Corr.1 (1982) at [488]. 
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instigation of one state involved in the dispute, but does not provide a binding outcome.
32
 
Despite this the provision did not receive unanimous support in the working group, further 
demonstrating the division that it caused.
33
 
 
The final version of Article 33 provides a three stage process for dispute resolution. It begins by 
stating that in the event of a dispute parties should begin by trying to settle the matter peacefully 
by engaging in negotiations.
34
 If the parties cannot reach a settlement through negotiations they 
can jointly seek the use of good officers of, or request mediation or conciliation by, a third 
party.
35
 States can also make use of a previously established joint watercourse institution, or have 
recourse to arbitration or the ICJ in order to resolve the matter.
36
 
 
The UN Convention goes on to say that if parties are unable to settle the matter through recourse 
to the above means within six months, “the dispute shall be submitted, at the request of any of 
the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact finding” by a commission.
37
 The commission should 
investigate the allegations made by each state, and make “such recommendations as it deems 
appropriate for an equitable solution of the dispute, which the parties concerned shall consider in 
good faith”.
38
 
 
This final stage shows the compromise. Although states are required to engage in the fact finding 
process if they do not reach a settlement within six months, they do not have to follow the 
recommendations that the fact finding commission provides them with. The value of this 
compromise will be discussed in the final section on the paper, where a different framework for 
dispute resolution is proposed.  
                                                           
32
 P Wouters “The Legal Response to International Water Scarcity and Water Conflicts: The UN Watercourses 
Convention and Beyond” (1999) 42 German Yearbook of International Law 292 at 315. 
33
 Votes: 33 in favor, five against and 25 abstentions. The reasons for states voting against the provision differed, 
some thought the provisions were too strong and others thought they did not provide adequate protection. Text of the 
preamble (1
st
, 5
th
 and 8
th
 paragraphs), articles 2(c), 8(1), 12 (title), 17(3), 18, 20 and 30 and annex (Arbitration) 
adopted ad referendum by the Working Group of the Whole: 6
th
 Committee, Working Group of the Whole for the 
Elaboration of a Convention on the Law o the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 
A/C.6/51/NUW/WG/L.3/Add.1 (1997); Wouters, above n 32, at 315-6. 
34
 Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 33(1). 
35
 Art 33(2). 
36
 Art 33(2). There is an annex to the convention setting out the structure of arbitration. Interestingly this provides a 
time limit for any arbitral decision to be rendered within. Article 14 of the Annex provides that decisions must be 
issued within five months of the tribunal being fully constituted, although they may take an extra five months if an 
extension is necessary.  
37
 Art 33(3). 
38
 Art 33(8). 
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B. Individual Arrangements 
As was noted above, many states that share a watercourse have agreements in place relating to its 
management. These agreements often include dispute resolution provisions which are similar to 
the UN Convention although the options may be placed in a different order from the UN 
Convention to reflect the parties’ preferences.  
 
One of the key differences in the structure of the dispute resolution provisions in specific 
watercourse agreements is that they often include the establishment of a joint commission. Joint 
commissions regularly have a role in the day-to-day management of the watercourse putting 
them in a good position to resolve any disagreements between the states. This is different from 
the UN Convention conception, which sees them as an institution to be engaged with once 
negotiations between the parties fail.  
1. Indus Waters Treaty 
An example of an individualised agreement is the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India and 
Pakistan. Article 18 provides that if any questions relating to the interpretation, application or 
breach of the Treaty arise the matter shall first be examined by the Permanent Indus Commission 
(PIC). The PIC “will endeavour to resolve the question by agreement”.
39
 If the matter cannot be 
resolved by the PIC, it may be resolved by the governments through negotiation.
40
 This may be 
aided by the services of a mediator.
41
 If the parties cannot resolve the dispute through negotiated 
means the matter can be submitted to arbitration.
42
 Under the agreement a Court of Arbitration 
can be unilaterally established in order for the dispute to be resolved.
43
 
2. Budapest Treaty  
However, even if an agreement between the states is in place the parties may not have turned 
their minds to detailed dispute resolution mechanisms like those in the UN Convention or the 
Indus Waters Treaty. This was the case with the Budapest Treaty of 16 September 1977 on the 
Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks on the Danube 
(Budapest Treaty). Article 27 simply stated that “[t]he settlement of disputes in matters relating 
to the realisation and operation of the System of Locks shall be a function of the government 
                                                           
39
 Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pakistan 419 UNTS 126 (Signed 19 September 1960), art 18(1). 
40
 Art 18(4). 
41
 Art 18(4). 
42
 Art 18(5). 
43
 Art 18(5). 
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delegates”.
44
 It goes on to say that if the delegates cannot reach an agreement on the matters, it 
should be referred to the governments of the contracting states for resolution.
45
 
 
This provision provides no guidance to the governments as to what to do in the event that 
negotiations fail to reach a resolution. When a dispute arose under the Budapest Treaty the 
governments eventually agreed to take the matter to the ICJ. A discussion of the outcome in that 
case will feature in the following section which looks at the different ways in which states have 
chosen to deal with watercourse disputes in the past, and the varying levels of success of the 
mechanisms chosen.   
V. State Behaviour 
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the range of options that states have available to 
them to resolve disputes concerning an international watercourse. The following section will 
explore the methods that states have used to settle watercourse related disputes in the past 
through briefly looking at a number of case studies.  It will examine the general nature of the 
process, and provide information as to how the different mechanisms were used in practice and 
their effectiveness in resolving the matter.  
A. Negotiation  
Negotiation is normally the first method of dispute settlement employed by states when a dispute 
arises in any area of international relations.
46
 It is also often the only method employed, due to its 
high success rate at resolving disputes, both in the watercourse context, and generally.
47
  
 
Due to most inter-state negotiations being conducted in private there are few records as to how 
negotiations have been used to resolve disputes. Information about a negotiation often only 
becomes available when it has been unsuccessful and the parties have progressed to a more 
public forum in an attempt to settle the matter. In light of this the following section will outline a 
                                                           
44
 Treaty Concerning the Construction and Operation of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Hungary-
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number of features which make negotiations attractive to states seeking to resolve a dispute 
concerning an international watercourse. 
1. Benefits of the Negotiation Process 
Negotiations are engaged in as a first stage in dispute resolution for highly pragmatic reasons.
48
 
Negotiations are generally more cost effective than other forms of dispute resolution and states 
are able to remain in control of the process, which is particularly important when the matter 
relates to a vital resource such as water.
49
  
 
The control that states are able to have over the negotiation process is due to its inherent 
flexibility.
50
 This flexibility extends to nearly every area of the process including who must be 
present, when and where the negotiations will take place, and the nature of suggested resolutions. 
This flexibility is beneficial in this context as it allows the parties to take broader considerations 
into account, rather than having to come to a result based on strict legal principles.
51
  
 
One particular way that states can benefit from this flexibility in the context of international 
watercourse disputes is through gaining the assistance of an expert in the field of watercourses. 
This person can advise the parties of the implications of a particular action on water flow and 
quality as well as the feasibility of suggested solutions to the dispute.  
 
The other crucial feature of negotiations is that the process can be as public or as confidential as 
the parties choose. The ability to keep the details of the dispute and any possible resolution 
private is often an incentive for parties to engage in the process.
52
 Confidentiality can stop a 
matter escalating unnecessarily, and can be beneficial in that it does not create a public precedent 
for future disputes. 
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B. Mediation and Good Offices 
In the event that tensions between states cause negotiations to be unfeasible, an independent third 
party may assist the parties in reaching a solution on the matter. A third party may also be useful 
in the event that negotiations reach a stalemate. This assistance can come from a mediator or 
good offices. This assistance can help to prevent the dispute proceeding to more costly binding 
forms of third party dispute resolution.
53
 However, this assistance requires the consent of the 
parties to the dispute and therefore states must be willing to move towards a resolution.
54
 The 
parties must also agree to any solution which is reached in the process.
55
 
 
The 1907 Hague Peace Conference described the role of a mediator as one of “reconciling 
opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the 
states at variance”.
56
 This reflects the active role that a mediator takes in the settlement of 
disputes through gaining the opinions of both sides and putting forward their own suggestions as 
to how the matter can be resolved.
57
 This can be contrasted with the more restricted approach 
taken by those acting as good offices that assist the parties in coming to their own conclusion by 
acting as a go between.
58
  These roles can be beneficial as often parties may feel more 
comfortable making concessions through a third party, rather than directly to the other side.
59
 
 
There has been some use of mediation in the international watercourse context, although the 
details are often only reported if it is unsuccessful and the matter proceeds to a more public 
forum. For example the European Commissioner attempted to help Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
resolve their dispute over the development of the Danube Dam.
60
 Mediation has also been used 
to assist states in reaching agreements to govern the management of their international 
watercourses. The Indus Waters Treaty is one example where mediation was used successfully in 
this way.  
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Despite mediation not playing a large role in this context in the past S.M.A. Salman has argued 
that the use of good offices and mediation may grow in the future with an increasing trend 
among states towards cooperation and the amicable resolution of disputes over watercourses.
61
 
The process has similar benefits to negotiation in that it is generally more cost effective and less 
time consuming than other processes of dispute resolution making it of value for states who want 
to settle the issue as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
1. Indus Waters Mediation  
The mediation conducted by the World Bank (WB) between India and Pakistan which lead to the 
Indus Waters Treaty is one of the most notable and successful examples of mediation being used 
in the context of international watercourses.
62
 The President of the WB, Eugene Black offered 
mediation services to India and Pakistan in the 1940s and 1950s in order for the states to 
formulate an agreement for the management of the Indus river system. This intervention 
occurred due to a fear “that the growing unease between India and Pakistan over water could be 
a potential flashpoint for war”.
63
 
 
Although this role began as one of good offices, it developed into mediation after the WB began 
making suggestions to the parties as to how the agreement should be formulated.
64
 The WB was 
able to provide the parties with the technical assistance and the required resources to formulate a 
management plan that gave each state an equitable share of the resource. The role played by the 
WB in this case has helped to limit the disputes between the states in the following years through 
providing for the resolution of disputes by the PIC.  
C. Joint Commissions 
The creation of a joint commission was one of the key aspects of the dispute resolution process 
in the Indus Water Treaty. Although the UN Convention discusses the use of joint commissions 
as process to be engaged in when direct negotiations fail, many treaties, including the Indus 
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Waters Treaty, provide them as a first option to be engaged with when a disagreement or 
question arises between the co-riparian states.  
 
A joint commission has a number of roles. They are often in charge of overseeing the 
management and development of a particular watercourse. In order to do this effectively the joint 
commission enables regular and ongoing communication between the states concerned.
65
 This 
communication is generally on a practical day-to-day management level, rather than through 
political actors. This allows for the interaction of multiple departments and organisations that 
have a stake in the resource.
66
  
 
The day-to-day management role of the joint commission means they are often in the best 
position to deal with disputes relating to the watercourse. This is because they have a good 
understanding of the practical implications of any development and can advise on how any 
negative consequences may be limited. This practical advice can allow for a quick resolution of 
the matter before it becomes an intense dispute. 
 
The dispute resolution role of the joint commission is aided by the fact that commissioners 
generally have competence in both the technical and policy aspects of the watercourse’s 
operation. The body is normally made up of an equal number of commissioners from each state 
concerned, and decisions within the body usually require a majority vote.
67
  Majority voting 
requires the representatives from each side to be in agreement before the matter can progress. 
This allows the joint commission to assist in both the avoidance and settlement of disputes.  
1. Joint Commissions in Practice 
Most joint commissions have had a high success rate for resolving disputes at an early stage. 
However, some regions appear to have more success with joint institutions than others. Joint 
institutions in Asia and North America appear to have a higher capacity to deal with disputes 
than those in Europe and Africa. In the latter two regions states appear to be more willing to 
submit disputes to more independent forms of dispute settlement like arbitration and 
adjudication.
68
 In light of this the two examples in the following section are from North America 
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and Asia, respectively. However, this does not mean that institutions in other areas cannot be 
effectively implemented.  
(a) International Joint Commission 
The International Joint Commission (IJC) was established between the United States of America 
and Canada as part of the Boundary Waters Treaty 1909.
69
 The IJC is composed of three 
commissioners from either state, who are independent from their respective governments. The 
IJC has a range of roles in managing the relationship between the states, including approving 
requests to obstruct or divert waters that flow across the border between the two countries and 
answering requests put forward by states as to the nature of their rights under the Treaty. 
Depending on the nature of the question the IJC’s response can be binding or merely advisory.
70
 
 
The IJC has had a good success rate in resolving the matters that have arisen during its 100 year 
history, with no issues having to go further than the body to date. This represents a success in 
one of the main aims of the treaty, which was to “prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary 
waters”.
71
  
 
One notable success of the IJC was the inquiry into the impact of a coal mine at Cabin Creek on 
a tributary to the Flathead River, which flows from British Columbia in Canada into Montana in 
the United States.
72
 In 1980 a Canadian company proposed to start mining in the upper area of 
the Flathead River causing concern about the impact of the proposed mining on the quality of the 
water in the river among those in the United States.
73
 The IJC was asked by the parties to 
investigate the impact that the mine would have in order to determine if it was compliant with 
the Boundary Waters Treaty. The IJC established a study board to undertake a technical 
assessment of the project and its implications.
74
 The process undertaken by the study board was 
in effect a process of fact finding, which will be discussed subsequently in this paper. The board 
made recommendations to the IJC, which were in turn handed to the parties. This included 
advising the Canadian company that the mines operation would violate the terms of the 
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Boundary Waters Treaty.
75
 Despite the ICJ’s recommendations being merely advisory the states 
followed their advice and abandoned the project.
76
  
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this outcome. Firstly, it shows the respected and 
neutral position that joint commissions can take. They objectively examine the facts, and even if 
the recommendations are only advisory they are likely to be followed by the states concerned.
77
 
Secondly, it demonstrates the importance of understanding the implications of any proposed 
project. The IJC had experts look into the plans, and examine their potential effects. A decision 
was unlikely to have been reached without this being undertaken. 
(b) Permanent Indus Commission 
One of the most prominent and often lauded as the most successful joint commission is the PIC, 
established by India and Pakistan in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, discussed above.  The PIC 
was created to “establish and maintain the cooperative arrangements” in the Indus Waters 
Treaty.
78
  The PIC is composed of one commissioner from each state, both of whom have the 
ability to bind their respective governments in decisions falling within the Treaty.
79
 This gives 
the decisions of the PIC an element of authority which is not shared by the IJC. The higher 
authority given to the commissioners in the PIC is likely to be because of the tense relationship 
between India and Pakistan which limits the willingness of the governments to interact in the 
same way that the United States and Canada do with the IJC.  
 
The PIC has been able to resolve most matters put to it in the half century since its formation. 
This is despite the high levels of political tension between India and Pakistan during the period, 
including two wars.
80
 The continued efficient functioning of this body demonstrates that high 
level political cooperation is not necessary for a joint commission to be successful.
81
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The first occasion on which the PIC was unable to resolve the matter put to it was in the case of 
the development of the Kishenganga Hydro Electricity Project. The disagreement over the 
developments legitimacy was put to the Commission in 2004, 2005 and again in 2009 but a 
settlement was unable to be reached on any of these occasions. This resulted in the Indus Waters 
Kishenganga Arbitration (Indus Waters) which will be discussed in a subsequent section of this 
paper. Although the PIC was unable to find a resolution for this matter themselves they 
encouraged the parties to continue to pursue peaceful means of dispute settlement. This example 
demonstrates that even if a joint commission is unable to find an acceptable resolution, it can be 
helpful in guiding the parties further through a dispute resolution process.  
D. International Court of Justice 
In situations where the states concerned are unable to resolve their dispute directly, an external 
body can be used to provide the states with a solution. The ICJ is one such independent 
adjudicative body which has been made use of in this area. Although recourse to the ICJ is 
provided for in the UN Convention and other individualised treaties, the consent of both states is 
required before the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear the matter.
82
  
1. Practical Experiences with the ICJ 
The following section will examine watercourse related disputes heard by both the ICJ, and its 
predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
83
 There is a large range of 
information available on these matters as the ICJ is a public forum.
84
 Although these cases have 
produced mixed results in terms of their success at resolving these kinds of disputes they 
illustrate some of the important features of the ICJ which are of particular value in the context of 
international watercourses.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“International Water Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Comparative Analysis” (1997) 13(3) International Journal 
of Water Resources Development 333 at 349.  
82
 See: Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 36; Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat, Karin 
Oellers-Frahm and Christian J. Tams (eds) The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (2
nd
 ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2012) at 660 – 691. 
83
 Merrils International Dispute Settlement, above n 3, at 127.  
84
 Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice there is a presumption in article 46 that the hearings of the 
court will be public. The states involved may demand that the public is not admitted to these proceedings, but this 
provision is not used often. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 46; Zimmermann, Tomuschat, Oellers-
Frahm and Tams, above n 82, at 1197 – 1206. 
 RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE DISPUTES  
22 
 
(a) Diversion of Water from the River Meuse 
The Meuse is a river which forms a large part of the border between Belgium and the 
Netherlands; although in places it runs entirely within the territory of the Netherlands.
85
 One of 
the main uses of the river is to feed the numerous canals which are used for navigation in the 
region.
86
 Belgium and the Netherlands had been making use of water for this purpose for some 
time, and a Treaty agreed to in 1863 provided guidelines for where the required water should be 
drawn from and limits on such drawing.
87
  
 
After the First World War the canals provided for in the 1863 Treaty were insufficient for the 
growing navigation needs of both countries. As a result both countries began the construction of 
new systems of canals and locks in their territory, fed with water from the Meuse.
88
 Although the 
new canals were not drawing water from the same points set out in the 1863 Treaty, neither state 
thought the other had the right to increase the total quantity of water they were drawing from the 
Meuse under the terms of the 1863 Treaty.  Belgium and the Netherlands attempted to reach an 
agreement to allow each project to continue, but this could not be achieved. 
 
As a result of the negotiations failing the Netherlands filed an application with the PCIJ in 
August 1936.
89
 Their claim alleged that Belgium had breached the terms of the 1863 Treaty by 
exceeding the drawing limits. This was met with a counterclaim from Belgium alleging that the 
Netherlands had also drawn more than its allowance of water under the 1863 Treaty.
90
 The PCIJ 
heard the parties’ arguments in May 1937, and released its decision in June.
91
 This is one of the 
faster responses from an international judicial body.  
 
The majority of the Court rejected the arguments of both states, finding that the actions of neither 
state breached the conditions of the 1863 Treaty. The Court considered that both states were able 
to do what they wanted within their own territory so long as it did not impact the specific 
volumes of water that certain intakes were not allowed to breach under the Treaty.
92
 As a result 
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of the judgment both countries continued in the development of their canal systems, increasing 
the amount of water drawn from the Meuse.  
 
The decision can be viewed as a success as it provided an end to the dispute. However the matter 
re-emerged in the 1990s when issues around conservation of the Meuse came to the fore. This 
time the states were able to negotiate an agreement. The agreement was entered into between 
Belgium, the Netherlands and France in 1994. The Agreement on the Protection of the River 
Meuse aimed to “preserve and improve the quality of the Meuse” by keeping in mind the parties’ 
common interests.
93
  The agreement also established the International Commission for Protection 
of the Meuse to protect the river against pollution. This provided “a forum for the exchange of 
information on projects ... that have a significant trans-boundary impact on the quality of the 
Meuse”.
94
 This body operates essentially as a joint commission and is likely to impact the way 
that disputes are dealt with in relation to the Meuse in the future. The willingness of the states to 
enter this agreement, and establish this kind of body, may reflect the past experience they had 
with the PCIJ and a desire to try to avoid engaging with the institution in the future.  
(b) Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
In contrast to the previous case the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros) case 
is a well-known example of where the ICJ’s decision has not provided the parties with a solution 
to the matter before the Court. The dispute arose out of the Budapest Treaty, discussed above at 
IV, under which the parties agreed to develop a system of locks on the Danube River as a joint 
investment.
95
  
 
Work began on the project in 1978, and proceeded largely unhindered until 1989.
96
 In 1989, due 
to public criticism relating to the adverse environmental impacts of the project, Hungary 
suspended their share of the works, later choosing to abandon them completely.
97
 A negotiated 
settlement was attempted in light of this, but when Czechoslovakia realised that Hungary was not 
interested in recommencing their role in the project it developed an alternative of its own.
98
 This 
project, known as ‘Variant C’, sought to dam the Danube River and cut off the water flow into 
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Hungary. During this period Czechoslovakia separated into Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
The development was within the territory of the new Slovakia and they moved to implement the 
plan with preparatory works which caused the dispute to escalate.
99
  
 
The Budapest Treaty contained some provisions for the resolution of disputes between the 
parties, which are outlined in section IV. The parties followed this process through to its 
conclusion, first letting the matter be handled by government delegates, then negotiating directly 
with some assistance from the European Commissioner. However, neither of these processes 
resulted in a resolution being reached.
100
  
 
As the Treaty provided no further process for dispute settlement the parties agreed, through a 
special agreement, to allow the ICJ to hear the matter.
101
 The matter was submitted to the ICJ on 
2 July 1993 but hearings were not held until in March and April 1997.
102
 During the period that 
the hearings were held the bench made visits to the sites concerned, demonstrating the ICJ’s 
ability to alter its procedure in light of the matter before it.
103
 Later that year the Court’s decision 
was released. This delay highlights the often time-consuming nature of ICJ proceedings.
104
 
 
The ICJ found that both parties had violated their treaty obligations, through Hungary’s 
termination of the treaty and Slovakia’s unilateral implementation of ‘Variant C’.
105
 Although 
these violations would generally entitle the other state to compensation, as both parties 
committed wrongs the ICJ held no compensation would be payable.
106
 
 
Despite both parties failing to uphold their obligations, the ICJ found the Budapest Treaty was 
still in force.
107
 The Court concluded that the parties should resume negotiations in order to 
implement the project, in light of the altered circumstances.
108
 The Court indicated that the 
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success of these talks may be aided by the assistance of a third party such as the European 
Commissioner, due to the parties’ opposition to altering their positions.
109
  
 
On the basis of the special agreement it appears that the ICJ had scope to provide the states with 
a more practical result. Article 2(2) of that agreement provides that the Court is to determine the 
legal consequences, including the parties’ rights and obligations, arising from its judgment.
110
 
The fact that the Court merely directed the parties to negotiate, rather than give any detail as to 
the rights and obligations moving forward demonstrates one of the pitfalls of adjudication in this 
context.  
 
Decisions such as this are not unique to this case. Referring parties back to negotiations is 
common to judgments relating to shared resources more generally.
111
 There may be a number of 
reasons for the Court to make decisions of this kind, including that they believe that the parties 
are more likely to adhere to an agreement if they reach it themselves. The fact that these 
decisions do not to provide extra guidance may also reflect the fact that the bench of the ICJ is 
made up of experts in the field of international law, rather than experts in the operation of a 
watercourse. Therefore the Court may not hold the requisite knowledge to provide a practical 
solution to the dispute, although they can enlist expert assistance in order to overcome this.
112
  
 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have continued to negotiate since the judgment, but no resolution 
has been reached to date.
113
 A framework agreement was drafted shortly after the ICJ’s decision, 
but this was not accepted by the Hungarian government.
114
  In light of this failure in negotiations 
Slovakia made an application to the court on 3 September 1998 requesting an additional 
judgement.
115
 This request was in accordance with the provision in the special agreement, that if 
there was no agreement between the states within six months the parties could submit the matter 
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back to the court to “determine the modalities of executing the judgment”.
116
 However, this 
application has not proceeded any further and the case remains categorised as pending before the 
ICJ.   
(c) Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay  
A similar decision to that provided in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros was seen in the most recent 
decision from the ICJ in this context, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay. The River Uruguay 
forms the border between Argentina and Uruguay and it is governed by the Statute of the River 
Uruguay 1975.
117
 This Treaty created an Administrative Commission for the River (CARU), 
whose role involved facilitating cooperation and communication between the parties as well as 
resolving disputes between the parties if they arose.
 118
  
 
During 2002 and 2003 a number of companies applied to the government of Uruguay to obtain 
consent to construct pulp mills along the banks of the River Uruguay.
119
 Uruguay informed 
CARU of these requests, as it was required to do under Article 7 of the 1975 Treaty, and 
meetings were held in order to obtain the CARU’s consent to the developments. On the basis of 
CARU’s consent, Uruguay provided the companies with permits to begin the construction of two 
pulp mills.
120
 
 
However, Argentina claimed that the construction of the two planned pulp mills on the River 
would breach Uruguay’s obligations under the 1975 Treaty. The relevant Ministers of Argentina 
and Uruguay held meetings to address these concerns in early 2005. These negotiations were 
unable to find a solution that both parties were satisfied with.
121
 
 
The failure of the negotiations resulted in Argentina instituting proceedings against Uruguay at 
the ICJ on May 4 2006 in accordance with Article 6 of the 1975 Treaty.
122
 This provides that if 
no resolution can be reached by CARU or direct negotiations between the states, within 180 days 
then either party may submit the matter to the ICJ for determination.
123
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There were a number of requests by both states for the Court to order provisional measures to 
protect the status quo while the matter was being heard.
124
 Provisional measures can be used by 
the Court at its discretion to protect the interests of a party while a case is being heard.
125
 In this 
case the applications were all rejected as the Court did not feel that the measures were required 
in the circumstances.
126
 This meant that the construction of the mill continued, and it became 
operational in 2007.  
 
In the case before the ICJ Argentina alleged that Uruguay failed to comply both procedurally and 
substantively with the provisions in the 1975 Treaty. In its judgment in April 2010 the Court 
found that Uruguay had breached its procedural obligations in that it failed to provide CARU 
with sufficient information to allow them to assess the potential impact of the development.
127
  
However the Court found that there was not sufficient evidence to show that Uruguay had 
breached its substantive obligations by failing to undertake appropriate environmental 
assessments and exceeding the pollution limits in the river.   
 
In light of the Court’s findings Argentina requested they make number of orders. These included 
that the mills be dismantled, compensation be paid and Uruguay guarantee they will not breach 
the 1975 Treaty again.
128
 Although the ICJ has the power to make orders of this nature, it did not 
think that they were appropriate in the circumstances.
129
 The Court instead encouraged the 
parties to cooperate in order to manage the future of the river in a way that did not lead to the 
need for judicial settlement of disputes.
130
 As a result of this decision the parties were left to 
negotiate, despite requesting that the matter to be settled by the Court. This was a similar 
outcome to that in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case.  
 
Argentina and Uruguay continued negotiations in light of the Court’s decision and an agreement 
was reached between the states in August 2010. This agreement provides for monitoring of the 
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river to ensure that the quality of the water is not impacted by the operation of the pulp mill.
131
 
This arrangement is to be overseen by CARU.
132
 This outcome appears a lot more positive than 
that in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, but it will take time to see if the parties are able to 
effectively manage the new arrangements or whether further disputes will arise in the future. One 
factor that may have influenced the more positive outcome in this case is the fact that the 
relationship between Argentina and Uruguay was not under the same level of strain that the 
relationship between Hungary and Slovakia was when the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros decision was 
made. The changing political circumstances in Eastern Europe at the time of the dispute were 
likely to have had a large impact on the interaction between the states. This was not a factor in 
this case making it easier for the states to reach a negotiated resolution on the basis of the courts 
direction.  
(d) Pending Matters 
Along with the decided cases, there are also a number of cases in this area waiting to be heard by 
the ICJ demonstrating states’ continued support of this institution. Certain Activities carried out 
by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Construction of a Road in Costa 
Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) both relate to activities on the San Juan 
River which runs along the border between the two South American countries.  
 
The first application was made by Costa Rica in November 2010, relating to activities 
undertaken along the bed of the San Juan River by Nicaragua in the course of the construction of 
a canal.
133
 The Court has issued provisional measures in order to stop further environmental 
damage before it renders its decision.
134
  
 
The second application was filed by Nicaragua in December 2011 after Costa Rica began to 
construct a road adjacent to the San Juan River.
135
 Nicaragua alleges that this development will 
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cause environmental damage to the river and detrimentally affect their interest in it.
136
 In mid-
2013 no interim measures had been issued, despite applications being made, highlighting once 
again the lengthy nature of the ICJ process.  
E. Arbitration  
Arbitration has a long history in the settlement of inter-state disputes, one that is too lengthy to 
be explored in any detail in this paper.
137
 Suffice to say that the modern incarnation of 
arbitration, with reasoned awards, has been visible since the end of the 19th century.
138
  
 
Arbitration has been used to resolve many disputes over history, relating to rivers, especially in 
relation to the delimitation of boundaries and navigational issues.
139
 Although it has also been 
used in matters relating to the development of a watercourse this has not occurred as frequently. 
This may be because inter-state arbitration has been somewhat declining in popularity since the 
end of World War Two which was when development issues began to come to the fore.
140
 
However arbitration has been included in most of the present day watercourse agreements, 
including the UN Convention and individual treaties, “either as an optional mechanism ... or as a 
compulsory procedure for disputes that the parties have failed to resolve by other means”.
141
 Due 
to its prominence as a tool for the resolution of disputes in this context, it is likely to be 
increasingly relied on to resolve development-related disputes in the future.  
1. Practical Experience with Arbitration  
The following section provides an overview of the two key development related cases that have 
come before arbitral tribunals. The length of time between the cases demonstrates how little 
arbitration has been used in this area by states.  
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(a) Lake Lanoux 
This case arose when a French company requested a concession from the French government to 
divert waters off Lake Lanoux in order to generate hydro-electricity.
142
 Lake Lanoux is located 
in the Pyrennes in France and feeds the River Carol which flows through France and into Spain. 
The use of the waters in the region was governed by the Treaty of Bayonne 1866. 
 
The original proposal put forward by France limited the amount of water that would be returned 
to the river after the diversion to the amount that was required to fulfil the needs of the Spanish 
people.
143
 However, after Spain voiced their opposition to the approach France amended the 
proposal so that all water diverted from the river would be replaced via an underground tunnel 
before it crossed into Spanish territory.
144
  
 
Despite the change in proposal to alleviate Spanish concerns, Spain remained opposed as the 
diversions would give France the ability to cut off the water supply to Spain. In an attempt to 
stop the project progressing Spain requested that the Mixed Commission of Engineers 
established under the Treaty of Bayonne investigate the project.
145
 The Mixed Commission was 
set up in order to ensure that its terms of the Treaty were complied with. Even though the project 
was found to be compliant with the terms of the Treaty, Spain still maintained its opposition and 
a compromise was unable to be reached as to how the project should proceed.
146
 
 
Despite this France continued with the development, which caused Spain to take the matter to an 
arbitral tribunal in November 1956 arguing that the project was in breach of the Treaty of 
Bayonne.
147
 Spain asked the Tribunal to declare that France should discontinue the construction 
of the works if no agreement could be reached between the two governments as to how to 
proceed.
148
  
 
The Tribunal rendered its award a year later, in November 1957. They held that France was able 
to undertake the project in its present form without breaching its obligations under the Treaty of 
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Bayonne, or any other principle of international law.
149
 As all the diversions would take place 
within French territory, and all water was to be restored before the river entered Spain, Spain 
would suffer no harm.
150
 There were no requirements in the Treaty which required the other state 
to consent to this type of project.
151
 
 
They noted that there was no principle of international law which prevented a state from putting 
itself in a position where it could cause harm to another state.
152
 This position is arguably not 
true anymore, as will be seen from the Indus Waters case where the Tribunal has held that a 
minimum flow of water must be maintained in the river. This was to protect the interests of the 
lower riparian state by ensuring that the upper riparian state did not have the ability to cut off the 
water flow.   
 
After the Tribunals decision France proceeded with the development of the hydro-electric facility 
and the water was diverted from the river as a result. France and Spain entered an agreement in 
1958 to ensure that all water removed from the river would be restored before the river flowed 
into Spain. This agreement remains in force and there have been no further disputes about the 
matter.
153
 
(b) Indus Waters Kishengana Arbitration  
The Indus Waters case is the most recent arbitral decision in this context, with only a partial 
decision having been released to date. Despite this case being recent, the allocation of the water 
in the Indus River Basin and its tributaries has long been a source of conflict between India and 
Pakistan.  
 
An agreement relating to the management of the rivers was reached in 1960 with extensive 
support and assistance from the WB. The Indus Waters Treaty provided that the Western Rivers 
in the region were to be under Pakistani control, and the Eastern Rivers under Indian control.
154
 
However, under the terms of the Treaty India was given a right to use the Western Rivers in its 
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territory so long as they did not impact Pakistan’s existing agricultural or hydro-electric uses.
155
  
The dispute in this case related to India’s right to use the Western Rivers.  
 
India sought to develop the Kishengana Hydro-Electric Project (KHEP) on a tributary of a 
Western River.
156
 Pakistan disputed the legality of this development from the outset, arguing that 
it would affect their own proposal for a power station, which was to be located further 
downstream.
157
  
 
The parties followed the process for dispute resolution set out in the Indus Waters Treaty, 
outlined in section IV, by first submitting the dispute to the PIC in 2004 and 2005.
158
  The PIC 
was unable to come to an agreement as to how to resolve the matter.
159
  As a result some 
reconfiguration was under taken by India in an attempt to make the design more acceptable to 
Pakistan. The matter was put back before the PIC by Pakistan in 2009 where they were again 
unable to reach a resolution.
160
 This was the first matter that the PIC has been unable to resolve 
since its inception in 1960. 
 
As the PIC was unable to resolve the dispute Pakistan attempted to negotiate with India in 
accordance with the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty.
161
 However, India refused to cooperate.
162
 
The lack of direct negotiations between the governments reflects the high levels of political 
tensions between the states.  
 
As the matter found no resolution through negotiation, Pakistan chose to submit it to arbitration 
in May 2010.
163
 This is the next step provided in the Treaty, and one that does not require the 
consent of the other state under the terms of the Treaty.
164
 Each state appointed two members of 
the tribunal and the final three members were appointed by industry experts. These industry 
experts were “the Secretary-General of the United Nations (for selection of the Chairman), the 
Rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, London, England (for selection of the 
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Engineer Member), and the Lord Chief Justice of England (for selection of the Legal 
Member)”.
165
  
 
The ability of the parties to a dispute to appoint the members of the tribunal is one of the key 
benefits of using arbitration compared to the ICJ. This feature allows parties to ensure that the 
people entrusted with resolving the dispute have the requisite knowledge in order to do come to 
the most practical and acceptable solution for the parties. 
 
The tribunal process began with the order of proceedings being set in December 2011. This was 
followed by the parties exchanging pleadings.
166
 The process culminated with a hearing on the 
merits in August 2012.
167
 In conjunction with these hearings the tribunal visited the relevant sites 
in both India and Pakistan to assess the situation themselves.
168
 The hearings were conducted in 
private, in accordance with arbitrations default setting of confidentiality.
169
 However, the final 
reports of the tribunal have been made public with the consent of the states.
170
  
 
In its partial decision, released in February 2013, the tribunal held that India was justified in 
constructing the KHEP as its project was underway before Pakistan’s.
171
 However they held that 
India would have to ensure a minimum level of water continued to flow into Pakistan.
172
 This 
minimum flow is to be determined in the tribunal’s final decision, expected in late 2013.
173
 They 
also held that India was not able to use the drawdown flushing technique to remove sediment as 
it would give them too greater control over the water flow. The tribunal noted a number of 
acceptable alternatives that India could make use of for this purpose.
174
  
 
The nature of the tribunal’s decision demonstrates the technical knowledge that members of the 
panel had about the operation of watercourses. When combined with the forthcoming decision, 
the tribunal has provided the parties with high level technical guidance as to how this dispute 
should be managed. This is something at that was not seen in the ICJ’s decisions that have been 
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discussed previously, which indicates that the nature of the decision given by the body may be 
impacted by the composition of the decision maker itself.  
 
Despite the more practical nature of the decision, it has yet to be seen whether tribunal’s decision 
will be adhered to by India. It will be also interesting to see if the decision has an impact on the 
way that India and Pakistan interact in relation to the management of the Indus River in the 
future.    
VI. Not the UN Convention Approach  
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the mixed approach that states have taken to 
resolving disputes in the international watercourse context. States have adopted an approach 
similar to that set out in the UN Convention, although they have not followed the process 
through to its conclusion.  
 
As was stated in part IV, article 33 of the UN Convention requires states to begin the process of 
dispute resolution by engaging in negotiations, then using processes such as good officers, 
mediation, conciliation, the ICJ or arbitration if they are unable to reach a negotiated resolution. 
If these processes are unable to resolve the matter within six months, the parties can then submit 
the matter to impartial fact finding. It is this last process of dispute resolution which states have 
failed to engage with in this context despite its prevalence in other areas of international 
relations, most notably human rights.
175
  
A. Why has fact finding not been used in this context? 
The placement of fact finding at the end of the UN Convention process is likely to have affected 
its use in this context. Fact finding was put at the end of the UN Convention process to give 
states an option in the event that the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal did not provide them with a 
workable solution. This kind of situation was seen in the ICJ’s decisions in both the Gabčíkovo-
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Nagymaros and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay cases. Despite the fact that parties could have 
used a method of dispute resolution like fact finding in this context they have chosen not to.
176
 
 
States may not have engaged with fact finding at the end of the process because they thought that 
there was little value in fact finding at that stage in the dispute resolution process. Fact finding is 
a process by which a commission, traditionally composed of impartial observers, investigates a 
particular incident in order to “produce a narrative of what actually happened” which may be 
useful in resolving the dispute.
177
 In doing this the fact finding body does not attribute blame to 
any party, nor does it come to conclusions on legal liability.
178
 One of the benefits of engaging in 
this type of investigation is to narrow the range of disagreements between the parties to the 
dispute.
179
 As the process has developed over time, the tasks undertaken by fact finding 
commissions have broadened and they have increasingly started to give information on the legal 
principles in a particular area as well as make recommendations for future action as part of their 
reports.  
 
If the role of a fact finding commission is merely to clarify the facts of a particular situation it 
seems somewhat obsolete after both parties have put their views on the situation to an 
independent body so that they can make a determination on the factual and legal position. This is 
even more so when combined with the ability of both the ICJ and arbitral tribunals to make their 
own inquiries in conjunction with the evidence put to them by the parties to the dispute.
180
  
 
Further, fact finding may not have been engaged with under the UN Convention process because 
it can be overridden by specific agreements that co-riparian states have put in place for the 
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management of the watercourses that they share.
181
 Some agreements of this nature were 
discussed in section IV, and these examples demonstrate that these agreements often place 
institutions which produce binding disputes at the end of the dispute resolution process.  
 
These reasons go somewhat to explaining why a process like fact finding has not been used when 
parties to a dispute have been unable to reach a result through other means, as is suggested in the 
UN Convention. However, the UN Convention is a relatively recent development and fact 
finding has a much longer history. The concept was contained in the Hague Conventions on the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1899 and 1907, although it was known in those agreements as a 
Commission of Inquiry.
182
 Although this historical formulation saw fact finding as unsuitable 
where issues of vital interests and honour were at stake, which could include rights to 
watercourses, this perception has changed over time.
183
 Now fact finding is viewed as suitable 
for a wide range of disputes.
184
  In light of fact findings long history it seems strange that it has 
only been used to a limited extent in this area, mainly in the work undertaken by joint 
commissions.  
 
One of the key reasons why fact finding has not been engaged with more in this context is that 
for the process to be effective in helping to resolve a dispute it requires states to be prepared to 
concede that their view of the situation is incorrect to some extent.
185
 Some states will be 
unwilling to concede that their view of the situation may be mistaken, and it is often in these 
situations that the matter is taken to an adjudicative process for determination. Those states 
which feel able to concede that their view may be incorrect are likely to be willing to cooperate 
with the other state involved in order to reach a negotiated solution, particularly if there is no 
joint commission involved in the management of the watercourse concerned. This means that 
there is likely to be little scope where fact finding could be invoked in the dispute resolution 
process. Its main role would be in situations where parties needed clarification on the facts to 
allow those negotiations to move forward.  
 
Fact finding in this context may also prove problematic for states as it requires a level of 
cooperation between the parties that may not be possible due to tensions, both related to the 
dispute and more broadly.
186
 The process of fact finding requires the states concerned to give the 
                                                           
181
Watercourse Convention, above n 4, art 3. 
182
 International Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 187 CTS 410 (Signed 29 July 
1899), art 9 – 14; Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes above 56, art 9 – 36. 
183
 Merrils International Dispute Settlement, above n 3, at 46. 
184
 At 59. 
185
 Lenk, above n 179, at 293; Merrils International Dispute Settlement, above n 3, at 63. 
186
 See: Lenk, above n 179; Palmer, above n 3, at 67. 
 RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSE DISPUTES  
37 
 
relevant body access to the areas in dispute so that they can gather evidence in order to determine 
what has happened, or the potential factual implications of a given action. This process can 
involve requiring access to official documents, relevant sites and an ability to interview effected 
persons. Some states may find this too much of an intrusion into their sovereignty and prefer to 
supply their own version of the facts to the other state concerned. This makes the objective 
nature of fact finding difficult and therefore the process may not be engaged with.  
VII. A Possible Approach for States  
Despite the fact that many states have not yet engaged with fact finding in the context of 
international watercourse disputes the concept is one that could be very beneficial in this area.  
The following section provides an alternative framework for dispute resolution. It has been 
structured in a way that seeks to harness the benefits of fact finding at an early stage, and has 
also taken into account states preferences to use third party adjudication as a final stage in 
dispute settlement.
187
 It is hoped that this new structure is able to resolve disputes related to 
watercourses in an expedient manner.  
 
The proposed dispute resolution framework could be put in place by states establishing a treaty 
to govern the management of a shared watercourse. Over time these types of agreements are 
going to become more important to ensure that watercourses are maintained in a way that allows 
the resource to be preserved for future generations.
188
   
 
This structure can also be adopted on an ad hoc basis by states that do not have their own 
measures in place relating to dispute resolution, or where those structures are limited. As the UN 
Convention is not yet in force states are not as risk of breaching international law by using this 
alternative framework. Although those states who have signed the convention are under an 
“obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty prior to its entry into force” the 
proposed structure is not a sufficiently large departure from the UN Convention to be seen as a 
breach of that obligation.
189
 The new approach contains the same essential elements as the UN 
Convention approach and maintains the overall goal of settling disputes by peaceful means.
190
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Further the UN Convention allows states to enter into alternative arrangements which adjust the 
provisions of the UN Convention.
191
 
A. Joint Commissions and Fact Finding 
Under the proposed framework the first step for a state to take after a dispute or disagreement 
over a shared watercourse has become apparent is to engage a joint commission if one is 
operating. These bodies are often created when states enter into an agreement for the 
management of a shared watercourse. Those who work within the bodies normally have high 
levels of knowledge on the daily management of the watercourse.  
  
The UN Convention’s preparatory materials demonstrate that the ILC thought that joint 
institutions were important in this area. In his 1990 report Special Rapporteur Stephen 
McCaffery suggested that although the formation of a joint commission was not required at 
international law, it is a form of cooperation “that is almost indispensable if anything 
approaching optimum utilisation and protection of the system of waters is to be attained”.
192
 This 
institution aids in building the relationships between the riparian states. Since this time, the 
utility of joint commissions has been shown through their increasing use, leading some to 
suggest that the creation of a joint commission as part of an agreement in relation to an 
international watercourse is required as a matter of customary international law.
193
 
 
In responding to a dispute, or disagreement, the joint commission should engage in a process 
similar to fact finding in order to objectively determine the nature of the dispute, the factual 
situation and the possible ways it could be resolved. As joint commissions are often staffed by 
technical experts they are particularly well suited to taking on a role like this. This approach has 
been used successfully by the IJC, as discussed in section V.
194
 If the joint commission does not 
contain technical experts a separate body with the required expertise should be appointed to 
assist the joint commission in this task.   
 
If a joint commission is not in place, or the commissioners do not have the required expertise, it 
is advisable for the states to establish a fact finding commission to undertake a similar 
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investigation.
195
 The UN Convention provides guidance on how fact finding commissions in this 
context should operate. This model differs from traditional commissions of inquiry and can be 
seen to more closely reflect a joint commission structure. The UN Convention recommends that 
each state that is party to the dispute has a representative on the fact finding committee, which 
has an independent chairperson. This is in contrast to a traditional fact finding commission 
composed solely of independent commissioners. This new structure is important as it allows 
states to have a sense of ownership over the process and may help in encouraging them to fully 
participate in the process and provide the commission with relevant information.
196
  
 
The ability of the fact finding commission to gather information can be hampered if the relevant 
states are unwilling to cooperate in the process and will not let the panel have access to official 
information. However a lack of cooperation from the state does not stop the commission 
interviewing people involved or impacted by a project, although they do not have the power to 
compel individuals to give evidence.
197
 The inclusion of state representatives on the fact finding 
commission also helps to alleviate any perception that the commission may be bias in its 
interpretation of the facts or the recommendations that it puts to states.  
 
Although the presence of state representatives is important, the presence of an independent 
expert is also of value. This person may be able to explore the problem in more detail through 
gaining information that a state may not have been willing to share if a direct request was made 
by the other state concerned.  
 
Through its inquiries the fact finding commission would investigate a given situation and 
objectively determine the facts.
198
 For example, this could involve examining a proposed 
hydroelectricity station in order to determine its potential impact on a downstream riparian state. 
This could include getting technical evidence from a number of sources as to how the plant 
would impact the flow of the watercourse at all times of the year, how it would impact local 
communities and examine any environmental impacts the project may have.  After the 
investigation was complete the findings of the fact finding commission would be presented to the 
parties.  
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In order for the fact finding process to be of value in the dispute resolution context it is likely to 
be helpful to states if the commission departs from the traditional position that fact finders 
merely provide an outline of the facts, and move towards providing the parties with suggestions 
as to how to resolve the dispute, which is suggested in the UN Convention. However, suggesting 
possible resolutions to the dispute does still not give the commission scope to directly attribute 
blame or make findings of legal liability. Distinguishing between providing factual information 
and assessing legal liability can be hard for fact finding commissioners. It is something that they 
must attempt to do as best they can. This may involve the commission providing the parties with 
separate outlines of the relevant facts and law, but not applying one to the other. This allows the 
parties to be fully informed about the situation.  
 
In providing the disputing states with recommendations the commission is also not providing the 
states with a resolution to the dispute. The states must consider the options put forward in good 
faith and make a decision how to proceed. This approach to the operation of fact finding 
commissions makes them of little difference to a joint commission.
199
  
1. Why should fact finding be used as a first step?  
This placement of the fact finding process is very different from the UN Convention, however 
the process has a lot of value if used promptly after a dispute arises. Placing the use of fact 
finding as early in the process as possible is one way limiting the possibility that the states will 
reach an impasse in negotiations and refuse to cooperate further. This was one of the hindrances 
to states engaging with the process that was discussed in the previous section.  
 
It is important to objectively determine the facts of a particular situation at an early stage as these 
are often crucial for the resolution of the dispute. This is particularly true in the watercourse 
context. The principles of international law which apply to the sharing of international 
watercourses, set out previously in section III, demonstrate the primacy of facts in this context.
200
 
For example theses principles require a state not to harm a co-riparian through its use of the 
watercourse. In order to determine if a state has breached its obligations under this principle, the 
implications of the activity must be determined in order to be able to go on to assess whether 
they have or will cause harm to the other state. 
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Moreover, often disputes arise because a state is unaware of all the facts in a given situation or 
they may “have a misconception about the state of things”.
201
 Providing states with clear 
information about the dispute at an early stage can help to stop the matter intensifying. An 
impartial investigation of the facts can also help the parties to resolve the matter, as the process 
can remove some points of conflict.  
 
A practical reason for engaging in fact finding early is that the availability of information is 
generally  at its highest at the time the problem emerges and decreases over time.
202
  This is 
particularly relevant if the question relates to the harm being caused by a development. People in 
the effected regions are likely to have much better recall the closer to the time the impact is felt.  
 
The scope of information that can be gathered by a fact finding commission is very broad. They 
are able to get information from anyone involved in the process. This is important as it helps to 
include groups that are unable to participate in more mainstream dispute resolution processes, 
despite their interest in the matter, including non-governmental organisations. These 
organisations are particularly important in this sphere as they often hold a lot of information on 
the environmental impact of particular projects which can make the fact finders report more 
comprehensive. 
 
It is envisaged that through providing states with an objective explanation of the facts, and some 
suggestions as to how to resolve the matter it will provide them a good basis to begin 
negotiations from. As Stephen McCaffery commented:
203
 
 
... a non-binding expert report, possibly accompanied with a recommended course of 
action, will frequently result in resolution of an actual or potential dispute without the 
need to have recourse to a procedure that results in a binding settlement.  
 
An approach of this kind, by using a joint commission or similar institution as a first stage in 
dispute resolution, is reflective of state practice. It seems that there has been a move by states 
towards more amicable and cooperative forms of dispute settlement which has been evidenced 
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through an “almost universal endorsement by watercourse states of institutional mechanisms as a 
first line of dispute avoidance”.
204
 
 
Although maintaining a joint commission, or establishing a fact finding commission may involve 
extra costs for states these processes have a high chance of resolving the dispute at first 
instance.
205
 This is likely to save states a lot of money in the long term as they do not have to 
finance an often long, drawn out dispute through the courts or arbitration.  
B. Negotiation  
If the process of fact finding is unable to move the parties towards a resolution of the matter, the 
next stage in the process should be one of direct negotiation between the state parties. This may 
be at a departmental, ministerial or head of state level depending on the severity and nature of the 
issue. These negotiations will also be able to take the benefit of the information established in the 
fact finding process.
206
 The suggestions for resolution of the dispute put forward during the fact 
finding process can provide states with a starting point for these negotiations.  
 
Negotiations may have more success in coming to a resolution due to the fact that the solutions 
which may be suggested in the context of negotiations may be more extensive than those put 
forward during earlier deliberations by a joint commission. Governments are able to bring 
different factors and policy positions onto the table in a way that a fact finding commission or 
joint commission are not. The resolution to a dispute may involve bargaining rights to one 
resource against another which only a government has the ability to do. However, these inter-
government deals are rarely made public and so the frequency of their occurrence and their exact 
nature is unknown.   
 
If states find it difficult to engage in negotiations directly, perhaps due to strong political 
tensions, they may seek the aid of a third party during this process. This assistance could be in 
the form of good offices or mediation. This intervention is aimed at assisting the states to reach a 
resolution themselves, which allows the result and process to remain under the states’ control. 
This assistance can come from a number of sources including other states, the Secretary General 
of the UN, UN departments and other non-governmental organisations. A party may volunteer 
their services if they see the states struggling to resolve the dispute or the states can request 
assistance themselves.  
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The limited number of cases in this area that have progressed further in the dispute resolution 
process than negotiation indicates that generally the combination of a joint commission or fact 
finding process and negotiations between the states concerned will be able to produce an 
acceptable resolution to the dispute.  
C. Arbitration and the ICJ 
Although it is envisaged that most disputes will be resolved through the use of fact finding, joint 
commissions and negotiations, these methods are not perfect and it is likely that there will 
remain a small class of disputes which require a further dispute resolution process. This model 
suggests that this final stage should provide for recourse to a binding third party decision maker 
in the form of arbitration or the ICJ. If states are aware that these options are the only alternative 
to reaching a negotiated solution, it is likely to encourage the states to settle the dispute at an 
earlier stage due to the time and cost involved in adjudication and arbitration.
207
 
 
Hearings, both at the ICJ and arbitral tribunals, can be costly and time consuming exercises. 
Although arbitration is generally thought of as being a more expedient method, costs are still 
high when compared with other methods of dispute resolution that states have available.
208
 
Because of this states are better to make use of other forms of dispute resolution as a first stage 
before beginning a court or arbitral process.  
 
Even if the earlier processes of dispute resolution did not help to resolve the dispute they may 
help in reducing the time and costs later. This is because states already have access to large 
amounts of factual information on the dispute, and often the matters at issue between the states 
have been narrowed as a result of earlier attempts to reach a resolution. This can help to reduce 
the time, and in turn the costs, of an adjudicative or arbitral process.  
 
As was noted in section V, before a matter can be put before either the ICJ or an arbitral body the 
consent of the states bringing the action needs to be obtained.
209
 This can either be obtained on 
an ad hoc basis, or states can give standing consent.  
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Providing for third party adjudication as a method of last resort is very different from the 
compromise option adopted in the UN Convention. Despite this state practice indicates that 
states involved in these kinds of issue prefer an approach of this kind.  
 
One reason for states preferences is that the processes produces a binding decision which it is 
hoped will bring the dispute to an end in an efficient manner. This can be achieved through 
arbitration and adjudication because decisions of both arbitral tribunals and the ICJ are final and 
binding.
210
 Past experience has shown that states generally comply with the decisions handed 
down by both institutions in order to maintain good relations within the international 
community.
211
 The ICJ has the additional benefit of having a mechanism to enforce judgments 
handed down if required, however the Security Council will only intervene to enforce judgments 
in the most serious cases and has not acted in this role to date.
212
  
 
These processes have also been placed at the end of the dispute resolution model because of the 
detrimental impact that they may have on the relations between the states engaged in the dispute. 
The adversarial nature of theses process mean that they are forums where states make their 
positions clear, and where states are, in theory, not willing to compromise. The processes also 
bring issues into the public forum which can increase the tensions surrounding the matters being 
heard. This is why states often only resort to these processes when negotiations have met a 
stalemate or tensions are so high that negotiations are unworkable. At this point there are few 
other options left which do not require the parties to cooperate.  
 
It is simple to say that states should take any unresolved claims to the ICJ or an arbitral tribunal 
for final resolution, but if both of these options are placed in a dispute resolution structure it is 
important for states to know how to determine which option to use in a given situation.  
1. Potential Distinction between Adjudication and Arbitration 
It is likely to be most beneficial for states to allow for recourse to both institutions when forming 
their watercourse agreements. However there are some differences between the structure and 
practices of each institution which mean that they are likely to be better suited to different kinds 
of disputes.  
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A potential way to distinguish between which matters should be submitted to each institution is 
to look at the outcome that the states seek from the process. That is, whether they are seeking 
redress for harm done, or whether they wish to come to a practical settlement about a 
development project. If the matter relates to the search for redress for the breach of international 
law or a treaty the matter should be heard by the ICJ. The redress sought in these kinds of 
situations could include declarations for breaching international law, orders to remove structures 
from the watercourse or compensation of a different kind.
213
 Whereas if the case relates to a 
development project, particularly if it has yet to be undertaken or completed, which the party 
wishes to be altered to respect their rights, the matter is likely to be better dealt with if it is 
addressed by an arbitral tribunal. The tribunal is able to address the parties positions and look to 
find a practical way forward, respecting both sides interests.  
 
This distinction reflects the institutions structures, particularly the composition of the decision 
maker. In the ICJ context the bench is composed of experts in the field of international law.
214
 In 
arbitration the tribunal can be, and often is, composed of individuals with technical knowledge in 
the relevant field.
215
 This allows them to develop practical solutions in order to modify 
developments to fall within set guidelines, which those with only a legal knowledge may not 
have the skill set to do by themselves.
216
 An arbitral tribunal’s ability to look outside the confines 
of international law if requested to do so by the parties also aids in their ability to find a practical 
solution to the matter at hand.
217
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The difference in expertise was demonstrated in the different outcomes in the cases heard by the 
different institutions discussed in previous sections of this paper. This distinction in outcome is 
most noticeable when comparing the ICJ’s decisions in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills on 
the River Uruguay with the arbitral tribunal’s decision in Indus Waters, discussed in section V. 
In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay the ICJ knew the parties had 
breached their obligations, but chose not to provide them with a definitive way forward to 
resolve the dispute. One explanation for this approach to the case is that the bench did not have 
technical knowledge required to determine how the states should seek to manage the watercourse 
in the future. Sending the parties back to negotiations in light of clarifying their legal rights had 
mixed results in these cases, with a negotiated agreement being reached in Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay and not in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros. In Indus Waters the tribunal is seeking to 
provide firm limits in order to protect Pakistan’s right to the waters as members of the tribunal 
have the technical knowledge to apply the scientific material before them, however, it remains 
unclear how effective this decision will be.  
 
This is only one potential way in which states can choose between arbitration and adjudication. 
There may be other factors which guide states choices. States decisions can be impacted by the 
different standards of confidentiality between the two institutions, the ability to choose the 
decision maker and any time constraints that the states concerned are under. Other factors may 
include the ability of third states to intervene in the process and the practice of the respective 
institutions in relation to appointing experts.
218
 Determining which institution to refer a dispute 
to will always be a matter to be determined by the parties in the particular circumstances.  
D. The International Law Commissions Approach  
The suggested dispute resolution structure put forward in this paper is based on the dispute 
resolution provisions suggested early in the UN Conventions development. The thoughts of a 
series of Special Rapporteurs have been combined with state practices to form the structure 
outlined in the previous section.  
 
The first Special Rapporteur involved in the drafting of the dispute resolution provisions for the 
ILC was Stephen Schwebel. Through his reports he suggested a four stage process for the 
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resolution of disputes. The first stage involved a commission of inquiry investigating the dispute. 
It appears that he foresaw the inquiry to have a traditional role in supplying the parties with an 
overview of the facts, but not suggestions as to how to resolve the disputes.
219
 The report 
indicates that states should then proceed to negotiate on the basis of the information put forward 
by the independent commission. If no solution was able to be reached through negotiations after 
six months, states could submit the matter to conciliation.
220
 Conciliation involves an 
independent panel investigating the facts and making suggestions for settlement.
221
 The options 
for settlement put forward by the conciliation commission were not binding on the parties. Over 
time the process of fact finding, or inquiry, has moved closer to that of conciliation, and in the 
framework suggested in this paper the two forms of dispute resolution have effectively been 
combined into one stage. The final stage of Schwebel’s dispute resolution framework applied if 
the recommendations of the commission proved to be unacceptable to one or more of the parties. 
In this situation the matter could be referred to arbitration or adjudication after 90 days.
222
   
 
The dispute resolution structure put forward by Schwebel was endorsed by subsequent Special 
Rapporteurs. Although Jens Evensen and Stephen McCaffery made minor alterations to the time 
required before the next stage in resolving the dispute could be progressed to they accepted the 
proposal. They believed that it reflected the need for technical expertise in this area and thought 
that the options presented were likely to be politically acceptable.
223
  
 
The model suggested in this paper does not place time limits on any stage in the process to allow 
states to have the greatest opportunity to resolve the dispute in the manner that they choose. If 
states choose to put a structure of this kind into a treaty there is scope for them to include time 
limits at each stage, and this may alter the emphasis that is placed on each stage of the process.  
 
The framework for dispute resolution that was put forward in the final draft, and commented on 
by member states of the UN was substantially different from that put forward in the earlier 
drafts. The final Special Rapporteur on the project, Robert Rosenstock, altered the structure of 
the dispute resolution article due to time constraints on the drafting process. His version required 
states to engage in direct negotiations, with the option of using fact finding if negotiations were 
unsuccessful.
224
 It then required that if no outcome had been reached within one year states 
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should submit their dispute to binding arbitration.
225
 This final part was amended by the drafting 
committee to allow for recourse to the ICJ as well as arbitration.
226
  This was the version 
submitted as part of the UN Conventions first draft.  
 
However, as was discussed in section IV, states did not agree that this kind of structure should be 
followed in a framework convention. It was due to the reaction of the states, and the desire to get 
the principles of the convention accepted that alterations were made to the dispute resolution 
aspects of the convention.  The final structure, as seen in the UN Convention, was adopted 
without lengthy discussion as to its consequences.
227
  However, the benefits of the process 
suggested in this paper should be examined by states before they dismiss it based on its final 
stage requiring the use of the ICJ or arbitration. This is because the vast majority of cases will 
never reach that stage in the process. Moreover it always remains up to the states concerned to 
determine how consent to the processes will be given. This means that states cannot be forced to 
attend the ICJ or arbitration, which appears to be the main fear when it was suggested that these 
be included as the final stages in the UN Convention.  
VIII. Conclusion  
As the global population continues to grow our need for resources will increases with it. This 
growth is likely to increase the risk that states are going to be involved in disputes as to how 
scare resources should be shared. To stop these disputes from escalating these matters need to be 
resolved as quickly as possible. The dispute resolution structure provided in the UN Convention 
does not provide the optimum structure for this as one of the most valuable processes, fact 
finding, is left to the final stage of the framework. 
 
For this reason the preceding paper has proposed an alternative framework for the resolution of 
disputes involving the development of international watercourses. It is hoped that this structure 
will allow disputes to be resolved in an efficient manner by using fact finding at an early stage in 
the process. It is hoped that the advantages of fact finding explored in this paper will encourage 
states to use the process, both within this context and in resolving international disputes more 
broadly.  
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